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STATISTICAL INEQUALITY AND 
INTENTIONAL (NOT IMPLICIT) 
DISCRIMINATION 
MICHAEL SELMI∗ 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This equality business has proven difficult. Since the passage of the Civil 
Rights Acts in the 1960s, our nation has made undeniable progress toward 
racial equality, but it is equally undeniable that this progress has been more 
limited than what civil rights advocates had envisioned. Schools remain deeply 
segregated by race, with large achievement gaps persisting.1 Segregation also 
remains the predominant motif in housing—so much so that the push for 
integrated housing has largely been lost.2 In the workplace, African-American 
males continue to have an unemployment rate twice that of white males, and 
this has been true for decades and at every educational level.3 Relatedly, there 
is a substantial wage gap again regardless of the educational level.4 It has also 
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 1.  For a recent analysis of school segregation, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
SEGREGATION THEN, SEGREGATION SINCE: EDUCATION AND THE UNFINISHED MARCH (2013), 
www.epi.org/files/2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf. 
 2.  Although progress has been made on residential segregation in many jurisdictions, the 
progress has generally been relatively limited by most conventional measures. See, e.g., JOHN R. 
LOGAN, SEPARATE & UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS & ASIANS IN 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2011), www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf (noting 
that, on average, black and Hispanic households live in neighborhoods with one-and-a-half the poverty 
rate of predominately white neighborhoods); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 9 (2013) (“Despite the 
high hopes of the civil rights era, the finding that emerges very clearly is that the stark racial inequality 
in America’s neighborhoods that existed in the 1970s has been passed on, with little change, to the 
current generation.”).     
 3.  See Drew Desilver, Black Unemployment Rate is Consistently Twice that of Whites, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Aug. 21, 2013), http://pewrsr.ch/13FF0U0 (documenting historical unemployment gap dating to 
1954). Unemployment rates vary by educational levels with individuals at the lowest educational levels 
having the highest unemployment. But no matter the level, African Americans are unemployed at 
twice the rate whites. In 2011, blacks with less than a high school degree had a 31.7% unemployment 
rate and whites had 18.1%. For those with advanced degrees, the rates were 5.8% for blacks and 3.0% 
for whites. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 341 (12th ed. 2012). 
 4.  Even those African Americans with advanced degrees make less than whites who have 
obtained the same level of education. See MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS BY EDUCATION ATTAINMENT 
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been well documented that African Americans are overrepresented in prison5 
and in school discipline6 and have significantly less wealth accumulation than 
whites.7 
These statistics are likely to produce one of three responses, which I will 
refer to as (1) “Yes but . . . ,” (2) “Racism is everywhere,” and (3) “Tell me 
more.” Those in the “yes but” category are discrimination skeptics who resist 
concluding that discrimination underlies the observed inequities and seek 
alternative explanations. Those in the second group see discrimination 
everywhere there are disparities and may go so far as to cast racial aspersions 
on those in the first group. The third group wants to know more about the 
inequities, wants to know more about why wage gaps persist even at the highest 
levels, or why even affluent African Americans tend to live in neighborhoods 
that are less affluent than their white cohorts.8 To be sure, some of those who 
initially may want more information will turn out to be skeptics as there will be 
no additional information that could convince them that the inequities are the 
product of discrimination. 
This article examines how we can reach agreement and come to a mutual 
understanding about when discrimination is responsible for the many 
inequalities that persist in society. This is a critical question because in the 
United States, as a matter of policy, we are committed to remedying 
discrimination, not inequality. In other words, we will only address inequality  
 
 
 
 
IN 2014 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2015/median-
weekly-earnings-by-education-gender-race-and-ethnicity-in-2014.htm.  
 5.  Based on the latest statistics on inmates in state and federal—but not local—prisons, African 
Americans are imprisoned at a rate that is six times higher than that for whites, with black males 
incarcerated at a rate that is nine times higher than the rate for white males. See E. ANN CARSON, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013 3 (2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. 36% of the 1.5 million prisoners were African Americans. 
Although this has been a long-standing issue, Professor Michelle Alexander has brought heightened 
attention to the issue. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2012) (asserting that our criminal justice system has disenfranchised 
a disproportionate percentage of the black population). 
 6.  Inequities in school discipline will be discussed in the next section, but a recent government 
study found that, whereas African Americans comprise 16% of the public-school population, they 
account for 33% of out-of-school suspensions and 34% of expulsions. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2 (2014), www2.ed.gov/about 
/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf. 
 7.  Based on 2013 data, whites have average net worth that is thirteen times larger than African 
Americans, which is the highest measured disparity since 1989. See Rakesh Kochar & Richard Fry, 
Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession. 
 8.  This has long been true and was reaffirmed by 2010 Census data. See LOGAN, supra note 2, at 
1 (“With one exception (the most Affluent Asians) minorities at every income level live in poorer 
neighborhoods than do whites with comparable incomes.”). 
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that is the product of discrimination.9 As a result, it is important to have a broad 
and consensual definition of discrimination. 
This article is concerned with racial equality and will focus on two areas in 
which the data are strikingly clear but the causal links between inequality and 
discrimination are often contested. The first area is school discipline, especially 
suspension and expulsion, which has had a long-standing, well-documented, and 
disproportionate effect on African Americans, particularly on African-
American boys.10 The data are clear that African Americans are far more likely 
to be suspended or expelled for similar infractions than white students, with 
similar results for expulsions.11 The second area is racial profiling—particularly 
automobile stops, or what is colloquially known as “driving while black.” Much 
as is true with school discipline, the data on automobile stops are indisputable: 
African Americans—and to a lesser extent Latinos—are far more likely to be 
stopped than are whites, even though white drivers are more likely to be found 
in possession of contraband.12 Yet in both of these areas, there is strong 
resistance by responsible policymakers to attributing these inequities to 
discrimination, particularly in the context of police stops where the “yes but” 
perspective prevails as every possible alternative explanation is explored and 
asserted.13 I have decided to focus on these two areas because the relevant data 
are compelling, and the public’s desire to avoid a finding of discrimination often 
appears to be equally strong. 
The third part of this article discusses the high standards imputed to 
statistical inequities as proof of discrimination and the many ways in which 
discrimination skeptics and others seek to avoid concluding that statistical 
 
 9.  Affirmative action might appear to provide a contrary example, but that is not necessarily so.  
From its inception, affirmative action has been a deeply contested policy and it has always been used as 
a modest tool of remediation. Affirmative action has taken hold only in higher education, an important 
but limited institution, at least in terms of addressing inequality. The courts, in fact, have squelched 
affirmative action in the housing context. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 
1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (invalidating quota program for public housing that was designed to integrate the 
housing). As to school desegregation, busing and racial redistricting might be seen as adjuncts of 
affirmative action, but both of those initiatives were designed to remedy discrimination, rather than the 
underlying inequalities, and both receded once it appeared that discrimination had run its course. In the 
context of busing, three short years after approving busing as a remedy to desegregate schools, the 
Supreme Court prohibited busing that sought to cross school district boundaries, severely limiting 
busing’s remedial force. Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(approving busing as a remedial option to desegregate schools), with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974) (invalidating busing plan that sought to include the Detroit suburbs). In the voting rights 
context, the Supreme Court was hostile to racial redistricting from the outset. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to and rejecting North Carolina’s redistricting plan). 
 10.  See Section II.A, infra. 
 11.  See Section II.A, infra.  
 12.  The issue is discussed in Section II.B, infra. 
 13.  For a thorough critique of studies that document disparities in police stops see Greg Ridgeway 
& John McDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND 
POLICING: NEW & ESSENTIAL READINGS 180–204 (Stephen Price & Michael White eds., 2010). These 
critiques, which often focus on possible differences in driving behavior between studied groups, will be 
discussed further in Section II.B, infra. 
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disparities are a product of discrimination. This article also suggests, contrary to 
current trends in scholarship, that the move to define the disparities as “implicit 
bias” has hurt more than it has helped and the observed disparities should not 
be confused with implicit bias as repeated patterns of behavior will almost 
certainly have a conscious component to them.14 Finally, the last part of the 
article suggests the importance of ensuring accountability as the best way of 
reducing statistical disparities, regardless of whether we can obtain consensus 
on the underlying rationale for the disparities. 
II 
RACIAL INEQUITIES IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND POLICE STOPS 
Racial inequities remain a persistent fact of social and economic life in the 
United States. Some of those inequities—many people place housing in this 
category—might be the product of class or even personal choices, and to the 
extent the observed inequities are the product of personal choices, it is often 
thought that there is little reason to intervene to address them.15 As has been 
well documented, ambiguity is often the death knell for efforts to address 
observed inequities.16 This part therefore avoids ambiguity by focusing on two 
areas in which the data are incontrovertible: school discipline and police stops. 
In these two areas, it is impossible to deny the existence of significant racial 
inequities, but attributing those inequities to discrimination turns out to be 
another matter entirely. 
A.  School Discipline 
There is a tragic quality to the data on school discipline, and it is that 
African Americans have been subject to far more frequent and harsher 
discipline than have white students. It is difficult to know just how long this has 
been going on but the disparities have been documented going back to the 
1970s when a Children’s Defense Fund report demonstrated that black students 
were two to three times more likely to be suspended compared to white 
 
 14.  See Part III, infra. 
 15.  This sentiment is most pronounced in the school desegregation cases, including in the most 
recent Supreme Court case where the Court viewed the segregation of the schools as a product of 
housing choices. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 713 (2007) 
(emphasizing that the segregated nature of the Seattle schools was a function of where students lived). 
This view that private housing choices are beyond constitutional reach has a long pedigree in the school 
cases. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting multi-district remedy designed to 
address discrimination within Detroit School District). For an analysis of the connection between the 
school cases and housing choices see Erika Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Public Decisions 
and Private Choices: Reassessing the School-Housing Segregation Link in the Post Parents Involved Era, 
48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397 (2013). 
 16.  For a discussion of how discrimination often operates in ambiguous situations—where there is 
no clear decision, for example—see Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The 
Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY COMPASS 
1, 5 (2009) (discussing ways aversive racism operates in ambiguous social norms).  
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students in various localities throughout the nation.17 Since that time, matters 
have actually gotten worse because suspensions and expulsions have sharply 
increased, and the harms of such school exclusions have become clearer.18 
The racial inequities in the administration of school discipline are so well 
established that a court could likely take judicial notice of them. In fact, it is 
difficult to find a jurisdiction in which African-American students are not 
subject to greater discipline than white students. Recent data collected by the 
United States Department of Education indicate that black students are 
suspended and expelled at a rate that was three times higher than the rate for 
white students, and that, although blacks constitute 16% of the student 
population, they account for 32% of out-of-school suspensions and 31% of 
student arrests.19 What is perhaps most alarming, is that the disparities begin as 
early as preschool, where African Americans account for 48% of out-of-school 
suspensions despite being only 18% of the student population.20 
The University of California, Los Angeles Civil Rights Project has also 
recently issued an extensive report on school discipline with similar findings.21 
In particular, the study found that suspensions of African Americans more than 
doubled between the 1972–1973 school year, when 11.8% of black students 
received a suspension, and 2009–2010 when 24.3% of black students were 
suspended.22 White students, on the other hand, experienced only a modest 
increase from 6% to 7.1% of students.23 Female black students had a suspension 
rate that was higher than the rate for males of all other races.24 
A recent study conducted by the Center for the Study of Race and Equity at 
the University of Pennsylvania analyzed data from school districts located in the 
South.25 In an astounding eighty-four of the 132 school districts, African 
 
 17.  See CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 9 
(1975) (“While the largest numbers of suspended children are white, proportionally suspensions hurt 
more children who are black, poor, older and male.”). 
 18.  See, e.g., James Wallace et al., Racial, Ethnic and Gender Differences in School Discipline 
Among U.S. High School Students: 1991-2005, 59 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47, 48. (2008) (documenting 
increase in suspensions). It has been well-documented that suspensions are connected with future 
involvement with the criminal justice system. See Anne Gregory, Russell J. Skiba & Pedro A. Noguera, 
The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 
59, 60 (2010) (“Research shows that frequent suspensions appear to significantly increase the risk of 
academic nonperformance.”). 
 19.  See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 2. 
 20.  Id. Although African-American boys are subject to the most discipline, African-American 
girls are subject to far higher rates of discipline than are white girls. Id. 
 21.  Daniel J. Losen & Tia Elena Martinez, Out of School and Off Track: The Overuse of 
Suspensions in American Middle and High Schools, C.R. PROJECT (2013), http://civilrightsproject.ucla 
.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/out-of-
school-and-off-track-the-overuse-of-suspensions-in-american-middle-and-high-schools.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. One of the study’s interesting findings was that school districts varied widely in their use of 
suspensions, with some large school districts such as Philadelphia being labeled as having a low 
frequency while many school districts had extremely high rates of suspension. See id.  
 25.  EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL 
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Americans were 100% of the suspended students, and in all 132 school districts 
black students were suspended at a rate five times higher than the rate for the 
overall student population.26 The study also found that although suspensions 
decreased overall in Texas, the disproportionate impact of suspensions on 
African Americans increased.27 These studies—and there are many more—paint 
a consistent and coherent portrait of the school discipline process that severely 
disadvantages African-American students and has done so since at least the 
1970s.28 
The data are irrefutable, but that does not end the debate or determine what 
the appropriate remedial response should be. Suspensions tend to be viewed in 
a binary fashion: either they are justified by the behavior of the students, or 
they are discriminatory. This binary approach is particularly prominent among 
lawyers given that within a legal framework there are no ties, only a winner and 
loser—a justified suspension or a discriminatory suspension. But it might not be 
so simple, as we will see as we explore the various justifications that are 
typically asserted to defend or justify the disparities. 
Skeptics of the continuing prevalence of discrimination are almost certain to 
respond to the statistics by asserting that the disproportionate discipline is the 
result of disproportionately poor behavior among African Americans. In other 
words, African-American youth are suspended more because they engage more 
often in behavior that warrants suspension. There are at least three responses to 
this claim. First, it should not be assumed that the excessive level of suspensions 
is the result of excessively poor behavior. To assume as much is to dismiss the 
force of the data at least its implications. And this would lead to the second 
response: How do we, or could we, know that it is the behavior of the students 
that triggers the suspensions rather than the disparate application of the rules, 
which are almost invariably discretionary in nature? For example, a study of the 
Texas school system found that only 3% of disciplinary actions were issued for 
behavior for which state law mandated suspension or expulsion.29 Most 
suspensions arise from behavior that is subjective in nature, such as disruptive 
classroom activity, that is not easy to document. It is also difficult to know how 
 
SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES 1 (2015), http://www.gse 
.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report.pdf. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  For additional studies see Russell K. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial 
and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment, IND. EDUC. POL’Y CTR. 3 (2000), 
www.Indiana.edu/~equity/docs/ColorOfDiscipline.pdf (summarizing findings of prior studies); Lyndsey 
Layton, Study Finds Racial Disparities in Texas Elementary Schools’ Disciplinary Steps, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 4, 2015, at A3 (“An analysis of discipline in elementary schools across Texas shows that black 
students, especially boys, are suspended and expelled at disproportionately high rates and are labeled 
as troublemakers as early as pre-kindergarten.”). 
 29.  See TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 38 
(2011) (“Less than 3 percent of violations were related to behavior for which state law mandates 
expulsion or removal.”).  
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many children got away with similar behavior or how many children received 
lesser punishment (detention or warnings) for identical or similar behavior. 
Third, a number of studies have disputed the differential-behavior theory. 
For example, researchers have found that many office referrals that ultimately 
lead to suspension are the result of students questioning established practices or 
teacher authority and that these students are disproportionately students of 
color.30 Consistent with this finding, African-American students are more likely 
to be disciplined for “defiance” and “noncompliance.”31 A recent study 
demonstrated that disruptive white children are often handled very differently 
than are disruptive black children—white children are more commonly 
provided with medical treatment, such as drug therapy, whereas black children 
tend to be treated in a more punitive or criminal way.32 In other words, 
disruptive white children are likely to be seen as suffering from Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, while similarly disruptive black students might 
be seen as bad kids or potentially criminal kids. Divergent judgments such as 
these are not innocent; rather, they represent differential treatment steeped in 
racial stereotypes. 
All of this is to suggest that, even if the behavior—or some of it—might 
warrant suspension, that is not to say that black children are not being treated 
differently or that lesser forms of punishment might be more appropriate. 
Seizing on suspension as an appropriate punishment is likely tied to perceptions 
that black children are troublemakers deserving of severe punishment rather 
than young children who need to be redirected in one form or another. Indeed, 
a recent study found that teachers and school administrators frequently treat 
African-American boys as if they are older and more responsible for their 
actions than is developmentally appropriate.33 
One of the key issues here is that the data that might convince a skeptic that 
the disciplinary system is being applied in a discriminatory way likely do not 
exist. There will be no data on overall behavior that would allow for 
comparison of the treatment of black and white students, and it would be 
infeasible to conduct a random experiment of children essentially “performing” 
 
 30.  Frances Varus & K.M. Cole, “I Didn’t Do Nothin”: The Discursive Construction of School 
Suspension, 34 URB. REV. 87, 91 (2002) (arguing that suspensions often occur as a result of a 
normalized discursive code that Anglo-Americans have better access to).  
 31.  See Anne Gregory & Rhona S. Weinstein, The Discipline Gap and African Americans: 
Defiance or Cooperation in the High School Classroom, 46 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 455, 459 (2008) (noting 
high number of disciplinary infractions relating to defiance or challenging authority among African-
American males). 
 32.  See David M. Ramey, The Social Structure of Criminalized and Medicalized School Discipline, 
88 SOC. EDUC. 181, 194 (2015) (finding that school districts with large minority and poor student 
populations are more likely to implement “criminalized” disciplinary policies and that white children 
are more likely to get medical treatment). 
 33.  Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black 
Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 540 (2014) (“Black boys can be misperceived as 
older than they actually are and prematurely perceived as responsible for their actions during a 
developmental period where their peers receive the beneficial assumption of childlike innocence.”).  
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in a disruptive manner to determine whether they are treated similarly. The 
statistics will either be meaningful or not, but it will be difficult to convince 
anyone by accumulating additional information. Researchers have sought to 
clear away some of the arguments by determining whether the disparities in 
discipline might be attributable to class rather than race, but after taking into 
account socioeconomic status, it is clear that race remains a significant predictor 
of discipline.34 
Even if it is the case that there is evidence that African-American boys 
misbehave at a higher rate than other students, the inquiry should not end 
there, because the question remains: What might account for the higher rate of 
misbehavior among African-American boys? One might attribute the higher 
rate to the nature of the students, but there is no neutral reason why one would 
choose that explanation over others. It may be that the misbehavior of black 
youth is in response to inequitable treatment in the classroom. A teacher may 
treat transgressions of black males more harshly than that of other students, and 
may also respond more harshly than to the transgressions of other students, 
ultimately leading to negative, reactive behavior by the reprimanded student. A 
student, for example, who is repeatedly told to “sit down and shut up,” or told 
that he will amount to nothing as occurs in some classrooms, may respond by 
what will be perceived as misbehaving. 35 Other students who are told that they 
must work twice as hard—a common message to African-American youth—
may rebel at what they properly perceive to be an unfair edict. 
When assessing data, such as the disproportionate application of disciplinary 
standards, there is a tendency to see that application as something other than 
discriminatory, even by those who seek change in the system. Teachers, it is 
often asserted, are likely acting not from discriminatory animus but rather it is 
their subconscious biases—stereotypes—that produce the disparate results.36 
This might be so but at the same time this is a circumstance that could just as 
easily be treated as a form of intentional discrimination. Certainly, for the 
ultimate decisionmaker, typically the school principal, there is nothing 
subconscious about the pattern of discipline. The principal will see all of the 
students who are being suspended and will know whether there is a pattern of 
disparate results. She, like others, might assume that the behavior warrants 
suspension rather than taking the time to inquire about how others in the class 
might be behaving, or whether the disruptive behavior might be the result of 
 
 34.  See Anne Gregory et al., The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of the Same 
Coin, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER, 59, 61 (2010) (“[T]he highly consistent finding that race/ethnicity 
remains a significant predictor of discipline even after statistically controlling for measures of family 
income suggests that student SES is not sufficient to explain the racial discipline gap.”).  
 35.  Extensive observational research has demonstrated that African-American boys are often 
treated differently and hostilely within classrooms and that their behavior is shaped by that differential 
treatment. See, e.g., ANN ARNETT FERGUSON, BAD BOYS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE MAKING OF 
BLACK MASCULINITY 88 (2000) (“This apprehension of black boys as inherently different both in 
terms of character and of their place in the social order is a crucial factor in teacher disciplinary 
practices.”). 
 36.  The concept of implicit bias is discussed more fully in Section III.B, infra. 
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unfair treatment at the hands of a teacher or school official. But it is hard to see 
why the principal’s decision to suspend African-American boys without delving 
further into the pattern of suspensions she observes should be labeled as 
unconscious bias rather than as a form of intentional bias. Her decision to move 
forward with suspensions without further inquiry is an intentional decision 
made against a background of clearly racial results. Alternatively, it may be that 
the principal wants to appear supportive of her teachers rather than challenging 
their actions. But it is again important to emphasize that choosing to support 
her teachers over her students is a conscious choice, one that may be putting 
loyalty ahead of rooting out discrimination. That is neither a neutral nor an 
inevitable choice, and again, there is nothing necessarily unconscious or implicit 
about making such a choice. It might be different if the principal, or a 
superintendent, reviewed the suspensions and determined they were justified, 
but to ignore the racial pattern of discipline is to choose some value, whatever it 
might be, over racial equality, and that is a choice made deliberately. 
B. Police Stops 
Another area where the data are incontrovertible but the conclusions are 
contested involves police stops. There are many kinds of police stops, but the 
two that have been most commonly subject to discrimination analysis involve 
automobile stops and stops on the street, which are also known as stop-and-
frisks or Terry stops.37 These latter stops are more controversial, though the 
findings are often even more compelling than in the automobile context. For 
example, in a recent lawsuit over the City of New York’s stop-and-frisk policy, 
it was shown that more than 80% of all individuals who were stopped were 
African-American or Latino, in a city where African Americans and Latinos 
constituted 52% of the population.38 The City sought to justify its policy by 
noting that a similarly high percentage of criminal suspects were African-
American or Latino,39 an argument the district court thought was too broad 
because it lumped all African Americans and Latinos together with the very 
small group that actually engages in criminal activity.40 One of the more 
interesting findings from the case was a statistic put forth by the plaintiffs: only 
about 6% of the searches were inadequate based on the law; the remaining 
searches were consistent with the governing legal standards.41 Yet the sheer 
 
 37.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 38.  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  For a thorough analysis 
of the case and the various evidence, see generally Arthur Garrison, NYPD Stop & Frisk, Perceptions 
of Criminals, Race and the Meaning of Terry v. Ohio: A Content Analysis of Floyd, et al. v. City of New 
York, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 66 (2014). 
 39.  Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the Stop-and-Frisk Verdict, NEW YORKER 
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-statistical-debate-behind-the-stop-
and-frisk-verdict (“On this basis alone, he concluded that six per cent of the stops—about two hundred 
thousand of them—were ‘apparently unjustified.’”). 
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number of stops—in the millions, based on the evidence presented at trial— 
meant that even a 6% error rate led to thousands of unlawful stops. 
In any event, the justifications for street stops are different in nature from 
automobile stops, and the rest of this section focuses on automobile stops, 
where the evidence of discriminatory police action is difficult to refute. This is 
not a new issue as vehicle stops by law enforcement drew national attention in 
the late 1990s based on a series of studies and lawsuits challenging highway 
patrol stops in New Jersey and subsequently in other areas, including Illinois 
and Maryland.42 These studies all demonstrated that the police pulled over 
African-American drivers in far greater numbers than their representation 
among drivers on the highways studied. At the time, many of the stops were 
part of a broader “war on drugs” and involved efforts to interdict drug 
traffickers who were using some of the main highways on the East Coast and 
elsewhere to move their products.43 But these stops had a quality similar to New 
York’s stop-and-frisk practices. Many officers seemed to be treating all African 
Americans, or only African Americans, as drug smugglers rather than the small 
cohort who were actually engaging in trafficking. The attention brought to these 
cases spawned legislation in a number of states that required police officers to 
record their stops and the reason for those stops. In other jurisdictions, such as 
Los Angeles, similar data were compiled in the context of lawsuit settlements, 
and it is to the more recent data that I now turn. 
The recent studies all show similar results: African Americans, and often 
Latinos, are stopped more frequently than whites and much higher than their 
representation in the population, although contraband is found at a higher rate 
among whites who are stopped. A 2014 report of Missouri vehicle stops 
statewide indicated that African Americans were stopped at higher rates than 
were whites and were 1.7 times more likely to be searched than were whites, 
even though whites had a higher hit rate—26.9% of searches produced 
contraband—than did African Americans, with a hit rate of 21.4%. In reviewing 
the report, the state Attorney General noted—in what seemed like a state of 
exasperation—that the racial disparities had increased since 2000 when the data 
collection began.44 In analyzing similar data from Rhode Island, the American  
 
 
 
 42.  The ACLU has been a leader in challenging racial profiling in automobile stops. For an early 
report, see DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S 
HIGHWAYS (1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highw 
ays. 
 43.  The drug-related enforcement efforts of the 1990s produced a number of lawsuits, most of 
which were unsuccessful, though many of the cases eventually settled. See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State 
Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting discrimination claims); United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 
F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding that statistics proved racial effect but not intent). For a 
discussion of the various issues in the early cases, see R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, 
Policing & the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 587 (2003).  
 44.  See MO. ATT’Y GEN., 2014 VEHICLE STOPS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014), https://ago.mo 
.gov/home/vehicle-stops-report/2014-executive-summary.  
9-SELMI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2016  3:35 PM 
No. 3 2016] STATISTICAL INEQUALITY 209 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) noted that in many jurisdictions racial disparities 
increased between 2003, when the first study in that state was conducted.45 
The New York Times recently conducted an extensive analysis of police 
stops in Greensboro, North Carolina, where pursuant to North Carolina law, 
detailed data are kept regarding police automobile stops. African Americans 
make up 39% of the population of Greensboro but accounted for 54% of those 
who were pulled over.46 Once pulled over, African Americans were searched at 
rates that were twice as high as the rate for whites, yet, just as was true in the 
Missouri study, contraband was found more frequently on whites.47 Among the 
various agencies the newspaper studied, the North Carolina State Highway 
Patrol performed the best in terms of racial disparities, although the numbers 
were not encouraging; African-American drivers were still 1.5 times more likely 
to be pulled over than white drivers.48 And in Durham, North Carolina, the 
authors of an extensive study found that “[t]he average Durham officer stops 
three whites for every four Blacks but searches one white for every four 
Blacks.”49 
The Times reporters also reviewed data from seven other states with 
reporting requirements and all showed similar racial disparities.50 In none of the 
studied jurisdictions did whites and blacks have an equal likelihood of being 
stopped, and in all but one, whites were more likely to be found with 
contraband.51 Despite that higher hit rate, African-American drivers were more 
likely to be cited or arrested.52 A statewide West Virginia study produced the 
same results: black drivers were 1.64 times more likely to be stopped by law 
enforcement officers and twice as likely to be searched, though there was a 
higher hit rate for white drivers.53 Despite that higher hit rate, African-
American drivers were more likely to be cited or arrested.54 
Two recent studies found slightly different results but reached similar 
conclusions. A highly detailed analysis of stops by Kansas City Police officers 
 
 45.  See Data Shows Racial Profiling Increasing in Searches During Motor Vehicle Stops, ACLU 
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://riaclu.org/news/post/data-shows-racial-profiling-increasing-in-searches-during-
motor-vehicle-sto. 
 46.  See Sharon LaFranieve & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While 
Black, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2015, at A1.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Bayard Lovell, Police Searches of Black and White 
Motorists (Aug. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/TrafficStops/ 
DrivingWhileBlack-BaumgartnerLoveEpp-August2014.pdf. 
 50.  Id. Seven states were studied, all of which had extensive reporting requirements, and particular 
jurisdictions and departments within those states were studied. The jurisdictions were Connecticut, 
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.  
 51.  Id. 
 52.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., W. VA. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SERVS., WEST VIRGINIA TRAFFIC STOP STUDY (2009), www.djcs.wv/gov/ORSP/SAC/Documents/ 
WVSAC_Traffic_NewOverviewofStatewideFindings2009.pdf. 
53.   Id. 
54.     Id. 
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found that there were no racial disparities when the focus was on clear 
violations of the law such as speeding, but when it came to investigative stops, 
African-American drivers had twice as high a probability of being stopped.55 A 
study of the Washington State Patrol found that, unlike in other jurisdictions, 
there were no racial disparities in the initial stops but that African Americans, 
Latinos, and Native Americans were all subject to higher rates of searches and 
citations even though the hit rate was higher for whites.56 
Despite the consistency of the findings, police departments are slow to 
acknowledge the role race may play in their stops. They typically offer one of 
several responses and often all of them at the same time.57 Often, in contesting 
the racial disparities that are found in the data, police departments suggest that 
it is inappropriate to measure stops by resident population given that actual 
drivers might vary from the resident population.58 There are at least two 
problems with this argument. First, many of the studies look at driver 
population, rather than resident population, and the disparities still stand.59 
Second, this is a classic argument that the Supreme Court rejected in the 
context of a regression study approximately thirty years ago.60 It is not 
acceptable, the Court unanimously held, that defendants simply assert some 
alternative explanation.61 Rather, they must provide some plausible reason to 
believe that the alternative might be true.62 In this case, that means 
 
 55.   See CHARLES EPPS & STEVEN MAYNARD MOODY, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS 
DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 110–14 (2014) (“We have shown that investigatory stops are the site 
of pervasive racially biased policing, whereas traffic-safety stops generally involve unbiased policing.”).   
 56.   The results of the analysis, which analyzes the results of other studies, can be found in Task 
Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s 
Criminal Justice System, app. at A-11 (Mar. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://law.seattleu 
.edu/Documents/korematsu/race%20and%20criminal%20justice/preliminary%20report_report_march
_1_2011_public_cover.pdf. Based on the studies, Native-American drivers had the highest disparity, as 
they were subject to search twice as often as whites. Black drivers had a 20% disparity and Latinos 
10%. Id. 
 57.  For a discussion of the various critiques see Clayton Mosler & J. Mitchell Pickerell, 
Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research With Applications to the Washington State Patrol, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 770 (2012); Ridgeway & McDonald, supra note 13.   
 58.   See Ridgeway & McDonald, supra note 13, at 186–87 (discussing how commuter driving 
patterns may differ from the commonly used population statistics). 
 59.   For example, a study involving the New Jersey Turnpike and stops made by the State Police 
had actual observational data. See John Lamberth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of 
Police Stops and Arrests of Black Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Exits or 
Interchanges 1 and 3 from 1988 Through 1991 (Nov. 11, 1994) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/faip/new-jersey-study-report.pdf; see also Geoffrey P. Alpert, 
Michael Smith & Roger G. Durham, Toward A Better Benchmark: Assessing the Utility of Not-At-Fault 
Traffic Crash Data in Racial Profiling Research, JUST. RES. & POL’Y, June, 2004, at 43 (using 
observational data in Miami-Dade county to determine driving patterns). 
 60.  See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986). 
 61.  Id. at 407.  
 62.  In Bazemore, the Supreme Court criticized the defendants for failing to demonstrate that the 
variables they claimed should have been included in the regressions would have changed the analysis, 
noting that the defendants failed “to demonstrate that when these factors were properly organized and 
accounted for there was no significant disparity between the salaries of blacks and whites.” Id.at 403 
n.14. 
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demonstrating some reason why the driving population would differ from the 
resident population, and this is never done. This also applies to another 
common explanation offered by defenders of the stops—driving patterns might 
differ based on race, but again, the defenders never provide any data to support 
the assertion. Instead, while acknowledging the disparities, the departments 
resist the conclusion that discrimination plays a role in the police stops.63 
Second, borrowing from the stop-and-frisk context, police departments 
frequently argue that they are stopping drivers in high-crime areas or areas 
where suspicious activity occurs.64 This argument is relatively easy to rebut. If it 
were true, one would observe a higher hit rate of contraband among black 
drivers.65 That the hit rates are invariably higher among white drivers refutes the 
notion that the stops are related to criminal activity. And it makes sense that 
the hit rate is higher among white drivers because police stop so many fewer 
white drivers, likely only when they have a reasonable suspicion. The 
arbitrariness of police stops for African-American drivers is thus confirmed by 
the lower hit rates. 
Several studies have sought to explore some of the alternative explanations 
police departments raise. Probably the most sophisticated study was conducted 
by Professor Ian Ayres of Yale Law School regarding the Los Angeles Police 
Department.66 The Los Angeles study focused on both automobile and in-
person stops and again found that African Americans were more likely than 
whites to be stopped, ordered out of their cars, frisked and subjected to 
 
 63.   For example, in responding to a study demonstrating disparities in police stops in Durham, 
North Carolina, the police department responded, “We acknowledge that the numerical data that is 
being put forth as statistical evidence illustrates a numerical disparity, but it does not offer any evidence 
or answers as to why the disparity exists.” EXEC. COMMAND STAFF OF THE DURHAM POLICE DEP’T, 
DURHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO THE FADE COALITION POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2013), https://durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2153. 
 64.   Evan Allen & Travis Anderson, Evans Defends Boston Police After ACLU Report on Racial 
Bias, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/10/08/aclu-charges-boston-
police-engaged-racially-biased-tactics-police-call-report-
inaccurate/Zev3p7jvRVQ2loKSWncu2H/story.html (noting that the Police “Commissioner William 
Evans defended the department, and said that officers focused on high-crime areas and individuals with 
gang affiliations and criminal records”). 
 65.  Hit rates, or the percentage of successful searches, were once thought to be the key measure of 
racial bias. So long as the searches of African Americans were more frequently successful than searches 
of whites, the disparities in searches could be justified. See Nicola Persico & David A. Castleman, 
Punishment & Crime: Detecting Bias Using Statistical Evidence to Establish Intentional Discrimination 
in Racial Profiling Cases, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 222–25 (discussing the importance of hit rates to 
assessing bias). However, once the studies demonstrated higher hit rates among whites, the emphasis 
on hit rates, at least among police departments, has disappeared. 
 66.   Professor Ayres is the author of a number of important studies documenting discrimination in 
a variety of fields. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender & Race Discrimination in Retail Car 
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 822 (1991) (documenting discriminatory pricing within car 
negotiations); Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in the Bail Setting, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1008 (1994) (documenting discrimination in setting bail). His work was 
transformed into an important and influential book on discrimination. See generally IAN AYRES, 
PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? NON-TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
(2001).  
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searches even though African Americans were 42.3% less likely to be found 
with a weapon than whites.67 African Americans were also 29% more likely to 
be arrested than whites, and Latinos were 32% more likely to be arrested.68 The 
study went on to determine that the stops were not an artifact of local crime 
rates, as the authors were able to control for various geographic and 
demographic factors.69 Despite the evidence, the Los Angeles Police 
Department immediately dismissed the Ayres study by claiming the data, which 
was from 2003 to 2004, was old, ignoring the fact that at the time the report was 
written, it was the most recent data that had been released by the Department.70 
Another study of the Los Angeles Police Department data reached the same 
conclusion and noted further that African Americans were subjected to the 
most consensual searches among drivers of different races, even though the 
police found the least contraband through such searches.71 
III 
STATISTICS AND DISCRIMINATION 
Not all statistical disparities are the product of discrimination but some are, 
and a question that will be central to achieving greater racial equality is how we 
tell the difference: How do we know when an observed statistical disparity 
should be equated with discrimination? Or to frame the issue in the context of 
this article: How do we know when racial disparities in school discipline or 
police stops should be treated as discrimination? It is important to highlight the 
phrase “treated as discrimination” because ultimately the question of what 
constitutes discrimination is a legal and social question, a judgment in the case 
of statistical disparities that those disparities are likely the product of 
discrimination, rather than any definitive definition of discrimination. 
 
A. The Meaning of Statistical Disparities 
There is no easy metric to define discrimination, but, ultimately, we have to 
determine how certain, or how confident, we must be, to conclude that the 
disparities are the result of discriminatory acts. In litigation, common statistical 
methods are used to determine the likelihood that the observed results were the 
product of chance or some other factor, such as discrimination. Depending on 
the data, it is also possible to employ regression analysis to ferret out, or limit, 
 
 67.  See Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowski, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los 
Angeles Police Department, ACLU (2008), islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/Ayres%20LAPD%20 
Report.pdf. The study is summarized in Andrew Blankstein, Study Cites Disparities in LAPD Stops, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A1. 
 68.   Blankstein, supra note 67, at A12.  
 69.   Id. 
 70.   Id. 
 71.   See Megan Armentrout et al., Cops & Stops: Racial Profiling and A Preliminary Statistical 
Analysis of Los Angeles Police Dept. Traffic Stops and Searches (June, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.public.asu.edu/~etcamach/AMSSI/reports/copsnstops.pdf. 
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alternative explanations for observed disparities.72 But the standards of proof 
are very high—typically, within the social-science framework that governs 
statistical analysis, one would seek a 95% confidence level—equivalent to two 
standard deviations—before eliminating chance as a possible explanation for 
the disparities.73 This is a significantly higher standard than the common civil 
standard that requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, which 
requires only that a plaintiff prove her case as more likely than not true, or a 
greater than 50% probability. Nevertheless, the confidence level is rarely the 
problem with establishing discrimination based on statistics. Rather, it is 
exceptionally difficult to rule out all other possible explanations, which is what 
discrimination skeptics generally require. In an infamous case, the Supreme 
Court failed to accept the findings of a study demonstrating racial disparities in 
the application of the death penalty even though the study controlled for more 
than three hundred factors because not every nondiscriminatory reason could 
be excluded.74 
To return to the earlier examples, the underlying question is how to 
determine whether African-American students are suspended as a result of 
discrimination. The observed disparities are only a starting point, but 
statistically significant disparities would support the assumption that the 
disparities are not the product of chance. But that would not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that racial discrimination is the proper explanation. Rather, the 
disparities could be the result of differential behavior; they might also arise 
from school districts that suspend high levels of students or from some other 
nondiscriminatory explanation. Even though studies have shown that African-
American students are typically treated differently for their behavior than they 
would if they were white, it is easy to discount those studies when it comes to an 
actual school district, and it will often be difficult to have appropriate data on 
the school or district level. The data on police stops is more complete but still 
 
 72.   The statistical methods are now well accepted. For a discussion of the use of statistical 
methods in employment discrimination cases, where they are likely most prominent in legal cases, see 
DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 204–10 (8th ed. 2010). See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical 
Methods and the Law, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 665, 667 (2000).  
 73.   Courts, in particular the Supreme Court, have borrowed the statistical methods beginning 
with an important footnote in a jury selection case. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.3 
(1977) (discussing the importance of tests of statistical significance in analyzing statistical data). Courts 
continue to require a minimum of two standard deviations, or the equivalent of a 95% confidence level, 
as a measure of statistical significance adequate to require further inquiry. See Adams v. Ameritech 
Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Two standard deviations is normally enough to show 
that it is extremely unlikely . . . that the disparity is due to chance.”).  
 74.  The case is McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), perhaps the most vivid illustration of how 
difficult it can be to persuade a discrimination skeptic. Nearly thirty years later, studies continue to 
demonstrate that African Americans who kill whites have a disproportionately high probability of 
receiving a death sentence. See John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death 
Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 647–48 (2014) (“Specifically minority defendants who commit capital-
eligible murders of white victims are over five times as likely to receive a death sentence as minority 
defendants who commit capital-eligible murder of minority victims.”).  
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lacking as to those who are not stopped, and police departments can still offer 
up hypothetical explanations for the disparities that are difficult to refute solely 
based on data.75 
Supreme Court case law provides important but oft-ignored guidance for 
assessing statistical proof of discrimination. In particular, Bazemore v. Friday 
requires parties challenging statistical analysis to refute that analysis based on 
the data rather than offering up alternative explanations.76 That case involved 
salary disparities between black and white agricultural extension agents. The 
defendants suggested that some factors other than race might explain the 
disparities. For example, agents worked on different crops, and it was possible 
that agents working on certain more desirable crops (tobacco, as this was North 
Carolina in the 1970s) might have been paid more, or those working in certain 
counties might have likewise been paid more.77 The Supreme Court held, 
however, that a defendant cannot simply offer hypothetical alternatives but 
instead must demonstrate the validity of an alternative explanation by using 
empirical data.78 In other words offering alternatives unsupported by data is an 
impermissible legal strategy. 
If followed, this principle would eliminate at least one of the rationales that 
discrimination skeptics use to reject statistical findings. However, the principle 
is rarely followed, including by the Supreme Court itself. In a variety of 
contexts, such as in the recent massive class-action claim against Wal-Mart, the 
Supreme Court has expressed skepticism over statistical methods of proof.79 
This suggests that it will be difficult to convince discrimination skeptics of the 
presence of discrimination purely through statistical analysis and that something 
more will be needed. What “more” might help is difficult to know; surely by this 
point in our history, we should not be looking for a smoking gun or a 
 
 75.    Data on racial profiling have been subject to extensive analysis. For helpful discussions of the 
issues that arise and the difficulty of dispelling doubt, see generally Chet K.W. Pager, Lies, Damned 
Lies, Statistics and Racial Profiling, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2004); Nicola Persico, Racial 
Profiling? Detecting Bias Using Statistical Evidence, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 229 (2009).  
 76.   478 U.S. 385 (1986).  
 77.   Id. at 394. It seems relevant to note that as a young attorney (in other words, many years ago) 
at the Justice Department, I worked on the Bazemore case when it was on remand from the Supreme 
Court. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   In the Wal-Mart case, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence by 
noting, “A regional pay disparity . . . may be attributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart stores and 
cannot by itself establish the uniform store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of 
commonality depends.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 357 (2011). Earlier in the opinion, the 
Court also expressed doubt about the likelihood of widespread discrimination despite the plaintiffs’ 
extensive statistical evidence, stating, “[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation – 
and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination – would select sex-neutral 
preference-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.” Id. at 
355. I have previously written on the Court’s skeptical treatment of statistical proof of discrimination in 
the context of the Wal-Mart litigation. See Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment 
Law After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011). For an additional case 
dismissing statistical proof of discrimination, see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996) 
(rejecting statistical analysis in selective prosecution case). 
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confession. But it also seems increasingly clear that further progress challenging 
statistical disparities through litigation is unlikely. Instead, as discussed below, 
convincing public and private actors of the need to address the statistical 
disparities will likely prove a more effective remedy. 
This is not to say that litigation will prove fruitless. Class-action 
discrimination claims based primarily on statistical analyses remain a small but 
vital part of judicial dockets, particularly in federal courts, and the claims are 
often successful.80 With class actions, success often turns on having the class 
certified because settlements typically follow, but a number of successful cases 
have gone to judgment in the last few years.81 It seems likely that many of these 
cases proceeded before discrimination sympathizers, those who want to know 
more as discussed earlier, but it is also the case that litigation remains a viable, 
if limited, means of bringing redress. 
B. Discrimination is Intentional Not Implicit 
In the area of contemporary discrimination research, there has been a 
parallel development that has further complicated proving systemic 
discrimination. Within the legal and popular literature, there is a growing 
fascination with what is typically defined as “implicit bias,” bias that is often 
described as unconscious in nature in that the perpetrator is unaware of her 
own bias.82 The typical measuring stick for the presence of implicit bias is the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT), an online test developed more than a decade 
 
 80.   The law firm of Seyfarth & Shaw produces an annual report on workplace class actions, and 
recently noted that settlements for all such class actions “reached an all-time high of $2.48 billion” with 
$295 million attributable to employment discrimination settlements. The employment discrimination 
settlements demonstrated a significant increase over recent prior years. See J . STEPHEN POOR, 
WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 1–7 (2016), http://www.workplaceclassaction.com 
/files/2016/01/2016-WCAR-final-thru-Ch-1-non-printable1.pdf?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium= 
syndication&utm_campaign=inter-article-link. A recent study of class action certifications also noted 
that even after the Wal-Mart decision, many class action cases continued to be certified. See Michael 
Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON 
L. REV. 803 (2015) (analyzing class action decisions after Wal-Mart and concluding that there was not a 
significant decrease in certifications). 
 81.   In a contentious and long-running litigation involving the New York Fire Department and its 
use of written examinations, the Second Circuit upheld a lower court’s determination of liability based 
on disparate impact theory but not disparate treatment. See United States v. City of New York, 717 
F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013). A gender discrimination lawsuit against Novartis Pharmaceuticals resulted in a 
trial verdict of more than $250 million, and the case was later settled for $175 million. See Velez v. 
Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 09194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125945 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010). The 
Supreme Court also recently held that the disparate impact theory was available for claims filed under 
the Fair Housing Act, a decision that is likely to spawn substantial housing-related litigation. See Tex. 
Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).   
 82.   The list is long, but, for a sampling of recent scholarship that emphasizes the role of implicit 
bias in contemporary discrimination, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, 
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin & Implicit Bias in a Not 
Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the 
Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2012). 
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ago that requires individuals to make rapid judgments based on screen images.83 
Since its inception, the IAT has documented implicit bias in individuals based 
on associating African Americans with more negative words, and these findings 
have been relied on to indicate that many people might engage in 
discriminatory acts without even being aware of their own discriminatory 
impulses.84 It is often asserted that this kind of implicit bias, in which an 
individual actor may not intend to act in discriminatory ways, underlies much of 
contemporary discrimination.85 It is now common for racial profiling and school 
discipline—and many other statistical inequalities—to be described as products 
of implicit bias.86 
The problem with this obsession with implicit bias is that implicit bias is a 
concept defined mainly by what it is not: it is not explicit. That definition, 
however, is not particularly helpful when one is trying to understand the 
underlying basis for repeated statistical disparities. If we think of explicit bias as 
equivalent to what is sometimes referred to as overt bias—the kind of bias that 
is present in signs such as “No Blacks Allowed”—nearly all of contemporary 
discrimination will be seen as implicit, which might then be seen as unconscious 
or unintentional, and in many ways less blameworthy because implicit bias is 
often defined as automatic in nature.87 Within the literature, particularly the 
legal literature, this analysis involves a two-step mistake, and both of the 
mistakes make it more difficult to address contemporary discrimination. 
The first mistake is to treat implicit bias as beyond one’s control. This is a 
distinctive feature of the IAT, which is designed as a rapid-response test so that, 
almost by definition, it is difficult to control one’s responses.88 But very few 
 
 83.  For an early discussion of the IAT see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual 
Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1464, 1465 (1998). The test is available at Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/. 
 84.   Within law, UCLA Professor Jerry Kang has been the most prolific supporter of the IAT. See, 
e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1186 (2012); Jerry Kang 
& Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 519 
(2010); see also Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. 
Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 18 (2009); Brian A. 
Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in 
AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 265, 266 (J.A. Bargh ed. 2007). 
 85.  This is a central premise of the implicit bias literature. See Dareen Leonard Hutchinson, 
“Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, and Race, 46 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 23, 28 (2014) (“Research on implicit bias finds that racism persists in the 
United States because people discriminate due to non-conscious stereotypes.”); Kang et al., supra note 
84, at 1126 (“[R]esearchers have provided convincing evidence that implicit biases exist, are pervasive, 
are large in magnitude, and have real-world effects.”).    
 86.   See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination & Implicit Bias 
in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (2006); Jennifer Eberhardt, Seeing Black: 
Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 878 (2004); L. Song 
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2036 (2011);  
Implicit Bias in School Discipline, KIRWIN INST. FOR STUDY RACE & ETHNICITY (May 8, 2014), 
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/researchandstrategicinitiatives/school-discipline/.  
 87.  The title of the book by the originators of the IAT is illustrative: MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & 
ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013). 
 88.   Id. at 39 (explaining that the IAT measures how quickly individuals “associate a group of 
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meaningful actions are the product of snap judgments, and this would include 
school suspensions and police stops, and we could add to the list, employment 
actions, sentencing decisions, and the like. Advocates of the IAT as a measure 
of discrimination often point to experimental studies that demonstrate limited, 
but meaningful, correlations between IAT scores and actual behavior.89 But 
what the advocates overlook is the extensive literature on the ability to control 
implicit bias. 
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that various interventions can limit 
the activation of implicit or unconscious bias. For example, individuals primed 
with counter stereotypical examples demonstrate less bias in their IAT scores, 
and the decrease in bias lasts for an extended period of time.90 Broader research 
on bias across a wide area, not restricted to the IAT, consistently demonstrates 
the efficacy of a review process.91 When individuals know their actions will be 
reviewed, they are far less likely to allow their discriminatory impulses to 
influence their actions.92 To offer one recent example, a study of baseball 
umpires found that umpires were more likely to provide a favorable strike zone 
to pitchers of the same race as the umpire, but the favoritism receded when the 
game was nationally televised, presumably because the strike zone would be 
more closely monitored by the national audience.93 In another sports study, the 
authors found that basketball referees reduced their bias in foul calls after an  
 
 
people, shown in photographs, with either positive or negative words”). 
 89.  See Greenwald et al. supra note 84, at 17 (discussing correlations between IAT scores and 
behavior). 
 90.  See Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing Automatically Activated Prejudice through 
Implicit Evaluative Conditioning, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 421, 422 (2006) 
(demonstrating that “automatically activated racial attitudes can be changed more readily than 
commonly claimed”). In this study, the authors used a technique known as “evaluative learning,” in 
which the subjects are primed, or debiased, with positive pairings based on race. See also Adam D. 
Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing Stereotypes, Stereotype Accessibility 
and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 722 (2000) (providing different 
perspectives can reduce stereotype activation).  
 91.   See generally Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reducing in Implicit Race Bias: A 
Prejudice-Habit Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1276 (2012); Calvin 
K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Prejudice, 7 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315, 318 (2013); 
Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: A Comparative Investigation of 17 
Interventions, 173 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1765, 1781 (2014).  
 92.   See Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing 
the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 594 (2006) 
(“Laboratory experiments show that when subjects know that their decision will be reviewed by 
experimenters, they show lower levels of bias in assigning jobs.”). The interesting research of Samuel 
Sommers has also demonstrated that white individuals may demonstrate less biased reasoning when 
placed in a diverse decisionmaking group such as a jury. See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity 
and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects on Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 
90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597 (2006). This research suggests that individuals who believe their 
actions will be judged by others, in this case African-American jurors, may work harder to avoid 
engaging in racial stereotyping. 
 93.   See Christopher A. Parsons et al., Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation, 101 
AM. ECON. REV. 1410, 1422 (2011).  
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earlier study revealing racial bias by basketball referees received widespread 
public attention.94 
Studies have also shown that those who are motivated to control implicit 
bias can often do so. Extensive research has shown that people can work to 
reduce prejudice in various ways: some may want to reduce only prejudice that 
is visible, while others will work to reduce prejudice even when discrimination is 
not apparent.95 The excellent work of Frank Dobbin and his colleagues on 
workplace diversity has demonstrated that when management makes diversity a 
priority, in part by designating accountable officials, results will follow.96 In 
other words, even if it is true that most discrimination is now implicit in 
nature—more on that in a moment—it is not the case that it is likewise 
inevitable. There are many ways to control and reduce bias, implicit or 
otherwise. 
The second misstep in the implicit-bias assessment is related and implicates 
the indiscriminate use of the term. Once individuals have been made aware of 
the presence of implicit bias and they fail to make any efforts to control that 
bias, it is far less clear that the subsequent acts should be treated as involving 
implicit bias. This returns to the fact that individuals are capable of 
controlling—or attempting to control—their biases, and failing to do so can be a 
sign that something other than implicit bias is at work. 
Returning to police stops, accepting that the officer does not consciously 
pull the driver over because of his race—which is the implication of implicit 
bias—all of the interactions thereafter will be taken with a consciousness of the 
driver’s race. The police officer will also likely know that African-American 
drivers are disproportionately pulled over and less frequently found to have 
contraband than white drivers and every step thereafter is informed by that 
knowledge. The officer will also know his own pattern of pullovers and 
searches. The decision to search the car will not be made in isolation, as a snap 
judgment, or without regard to the person’s race, but the officer will be 
conscious of the driver’s race and will make a deliberate decision to search the 
car, and do so against a known context of police stops. In other words, at least 
 
 94.  The original study demonstrated racial bias by basketball referees who showed favoritism 
towards players of their own race. See Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among 
NBA Referees, 125 Q.J. ECON. 1859 (2010). The original study received substantial media attention, 
which a subsequent study found eliminated all of the bias. See Devin G. Pope et al., Awareness Reduces 
Racial Bias, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19765, Dec. 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2370221.  
 95.  See E.A. Plant & Patricia Devine, The Active Control of Prejudice: Unpacking Intentions 
Guiding Control Efforts, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 640, 641 (2009). For a fuller discussion 
see Elizabeth Levy Paluck & Donald P. Green, Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and 
Assessment of Research and Practice, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 339, 352 (2009). 
 96.  See, e.g., Frank Dobbin, Alexandra Kalev & Erin Kelly, Diversity Mgt. in Corporate America, 6 
CONTEXTS 21, 26 (2007) (“Our analyses show that making a person or a committee responsible for 
diversity is very effective.”); Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage & Alexandra Kalev, Rage Against the Iron 
Cage: The Varied Effects of Bureaucratic Personnel Reforms on Diversity, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 1014, 1034 
(2015) (“Accountability to diversity managers or federal regulators . . . leads managers to be more 
attentive to the effects of reforms” [designed to increase diversity] . . . .). 
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after the initial stop, there is nothing implicit about the officer’s actions—unless 
by implicit we mean the officer did not claim to be acting because of the driver’s 
race. But that would be a highly unusual definition of implicit, or of 
discrimination more broadly. Proof of discrimination has never required a 
confession or even an acknowledgment by the person engaging in 
discriminatory behavior. 
The school principal is in the same position. She would observe that African 
Americans are overrepresented among the students who are suspended, and 
she would make the conscious decision to explore the basis for the suspension 
more thoroughly or to ignore that fact and proceed with the suspensions. Again, 
there is no reason to label her behavior as implicit and there is little to be 
gained by doing so. Surely, repeated behavior by governmental agencies and 
individuals, with layers of oversight, should be treated differently from an 
isolated incident by a single police officer or teacher, but the rush to the implicit 
bias explanation largely ignores the difference between aggregate and 
individual behavior. Contrary to the message of implicit bias, these are not the 
unconscious actions of good people who cannot help themselves; these are 
individuals who are, at a minimum, unconcerned about the racial implications 
of their actions.97 
To take a rather mundane but illustrative example, suppose Person A 
bumps into Person B and offers the common apology, “Sorry, I did not mean to 
do that.” Person B would likely accept that explanation on the first and perhaps 
the second incidents but, after the third, fourth, or hundredth, would likely 
reject the excuse and assume the person intended to bump into her, or at a 
minimum, was not paying attention or did not care. Even within the framework 
of implicit bias, at some point repeated behavior should no longer be defined as 
implicit in nature. There is no particular reason to assume differently about 
incidents in which the police, school administrators, employers, judges, or 
anyone else engages in repeated acts with strong racial implications after they 
have been made aware of the possible force of implicit bias and the ability to 
control it. 
There is, it would seem, a strategic desire to define behavior as implicit: 
individuals might be more motivated to change their behavior if it is seen as 
common and not racist in nature. As a strategic move, this may work with some 
well-intentioned people, but we have been waiting a long time for those 
individuals to alter their behavior.98 Emphasizing the strategic nature of the 
implicit-bias discussion is important because there is a tendency to treat the 
 
 97.  The subtitle of a popular book from the creators of the IAT emphasizes that that good people 
can engage in implicit bias. See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: 
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013). 
 98.  For an argument that change will rely on those who are well-intentioned see Katherine T. 
Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit 
Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1902 (2009 (arguing that changing discriminatory 
behavior “requires people who are committed to non-discrimination norms and determined to live by 
them”). 
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various theories of discrimination as if they represent a thing rather than a 
theory. To say that someone’s behavior has been influenced by implicit bias 
means their actions have been influenced by stereotypical thinking of which the 
person may be unaware and of which they will almost certainly disclaim 
responsibility. Fair enough, but their behavior could just as easily be treated as 
discriminatory in nature without the need for a label. Implicit bias suggests that 
its opposite might be explicit bias, which could be equated with old-fashioned 
discrimination or racist attitudes. This would be reflected in the common 
mantra “that we now have racism without racists.”99 But the world of 
discrimination need not be seen as binary in nature—it does not have to be 
either implicit or explicit, it can run across a spectrum that might involve some 
conscious attitudes mixed with stereotypical thinking. If we are forced to rely on 
a binary approach to discrimination, we should think of lawful and unlawful. 
Within that legal schema, as I argued many years ago, an individual’s motive is 
irrelevant to establishing liability though it can be relevant as a matter of 
damages.100 
Part of the problem with labeling troublesome behavior as implicit in nature 
is that soft-pedaling the behavior allows people to escape without responsibility. 
Moreover, it likely conveys the impression that there is something different 
about implicit bias than other forms of discrimination. However, the message 
we want to send, particularly where seeking to remedy the consequences of the 
underlying actions, is that implicit bias is just another form of discrimination, 
not a better or worse form of it. 
This is not to suggest that implicit bias is not a real or important concept—it 
is both and has aided our understanding of contemporary discrimination. It has 
been overstated, however, in recent analyses on racial bias. Implicit bias should 
not be equated with its counterpart explicit bias if explicit bias is overt, 
unambiguous, and inevitably leads to a finding of discrimination. That kind of 
discrimination on a broad scale has not existed for many years, and we should 
not define all remaining, other discrimination as implicit bias. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
It is certainly difficult to convert discrimination skeptics into individuals who 
see discrimination as remaining part of the national landscape. In many ways, 
the election of President Barack Obama has provided additional fuel for 
skeptics.101 The move to an emphasis on implicit bias has not had the salutary 
 
 99.   See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS (4th ed. 2013). 
 100.  See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 
86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997). 
 101.  The authors of one analysis of views after the election concluded, “Across race, gender, age, 
and income, Americans seem to have taken the election of an African-American President as a sign 
that the country has moved significantly away from its racist past.” Nicholas A. Valentino & Ted 
Brader, The Sword’s Other Edge: Perceptions of Discrimination and Racial Policy Opinion After 
Obama, 75 PUB. OPINION Q. 201, 216 (2011).  
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effect many might have expected, although it has certainly played a role in the 
decisions of some individuals and entities to address lingering racial disparities. 
Ultimately, whether the disparities are the product of implicit bias or something 
else should not be the determining factor of whether those disparities are 
addressed. Rather, what is necessary is ensuring that someone is accountable 
for those disparities, which need to be seen as problematic regardless of their 
origin. Any public-school official who looks at the suspension data should be 
troubled by those findings both because of the extreme disparities between 
suspension rates of African Americans and whites and the harm that students 
endure when excluded from public schools. The response to the disparities 
should not be that the students are getting what they deserve but that the 
disparate application of suspension must be addressed, a step a number of 
school districts are now taking.102 
The same is true with police stops, a context in which it will take initiative by 
a police chief or mayor to address disparities. Regardless of whether one 
concludes that disparities are the product of discrimination, the disparities 
should be seen as highly problematic and as surely contributing to tension 
between law-enforcement officers and the communities they are intended to 
serve. Upon taking office, New York City’s Mayor de Blasio quickly settled the 
litigation over the City’s “stop and frisk policy” and changed the policy to 
reduce the number of such searches.103 In light of the New York Times article, 
the Police Chief in Greensboro, North Carolina ordered his police officers to 
refrain from stopping cars for minor infractions, at least until the Department 
could better understand the underlying reasons for the racial disparities in their 
stops.104 Private companies can and should take the same initiative without 
waiting for a determination that their workforce disparities are discriminatory. 
The persistent racial disparities that we observe in virtually all walks of social 
and economic life demand attention. Even if implicit bias is the proper 
explanation for the disparities, those disparities, that bias, are neither inevitable 
nor uncontrollable. 
 
 102.   For example, Montgomery County in Maryland has issued a new policy designed to reduce 
suspensions as a way of addressing racial disparities. See Donna St. George, Montgomery Issues New 
Code of Conduct for Students, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
education/montgomery-issues-new-code-of-conduct-for-students/2014/08/17/5bce6f16-23dd-11e4-8593-
da634b334390_story.html (noting that Montgomery County’s new policy was designed to make 
suspensions a “last resort” as one way of pursuing student equity).  
 103.   See Matt Flagenheimer, New Message on Frisks from de Blasio’s City Hall Amid Criticism, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/nyregion/de-blasio-city-hall-now-
emphasizes-stop-and-frisk-drop-started-under-bloomberg.html (discussing change in policy initiated by 
Mayor de Blasio).  
 104.  See Kate Elizabeth Queram, Greensboro Police Halt Minor Traffic Stops in Response to Racial 
Diversity Concerns, NEWS & REC. (Nov. 10, 2015), www.greensboro.com/news/greensboro-polic-halt-
minor-traffic-stops-in-response-to-racial/article,42d2dfc7-ed33-5a96-9d33-c797ce0d4905.html (quoting 
Police Chief stating, “We must make the necessary changes to ensure that the issues, created by the 
statistics and perceptions, are . . . addressed”). 
